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INTRODUCTION

Significant landlord-tenant legislation was last enacted in
South Carolina in 1946.1 Even at that time, at least one legislator felt more fundamental reform was needed.2 Since that date,
major changes in landlord-tenant law have been made nationally, with great strides taken to equalize the landlord-tenant relationship. 3 The major impetus for the changes has been a different perspective in viewing the lease. No longer looking upon
the lease as merely a conveyance with no duty on the part of the
landlord to make the premises habitable or maintain repair,
courts have more recently viewed the lease as a contract,
and
4
have allocated responsibilities to the parties accordingly.
Although other jurisdictions have been dynamic in their
changes, South Carolina landlord-tenant law has slumbered in
1. 1946 S.C. Acts 873.
2. As John D. Long put it, "I am voting against the so-called landlord-tenant bill
because I consider the measure unfair and provocative of injustice. It is another bill to
help the rich at the expense of the poor and defenseless." 1946 HousE JOURNAL H. 194,
1518.
3. For example, in many jurisdictions a landlord is unable to evict a tenant as a
retaliatory measure. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968). A
tenant is permitted to treat the landlord's conduct as a constructive eviction if the landlord allows conditions within the leasehold to deteriorate to such a degree that it is unfit
for the purpose for which it was rented. See C.E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340
Mass. 124, 130, 163 N.E.2d 4, 8 (1959). Similarly, an implied warranty of habitability in
residential leases is now a fact of life in over forty jurisdictions. See, e.g., Pugh v.
Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 281, n.2, 405 A.2d 897, 901, n.2 (1979). See also, Marini v. Ireland,
56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970), which permits tenants the new remedy of
repair and deduct.
4. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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virtual hibernation since 1946. This Article poses the question of
whether it is now time to awaken from that slumber and reform
landlord-tenant law in South Carolina.
Because of the breadth of the topic, the scope of this Article
is limited to landlord remedies for a tenant's breach of a lease.
Three such remedies exist: ejectment, the action for rent, and
distraint. Each remedy poses its own peculiar problems and inconsistancies; all three, it is submitted, are due for a revamping
to bring South Carolina landlord-tenant law into the 1980's.
II.

A.

EJECTMENT

Introduction to the Remedy

The South Carolina legislature enacted the state's first
landlord-tenant ejectment statute in 1866. In 1878, the South
Carolina Supreme Court stated that ejectment was designed to
be "summary [in] character" and "expeditious" in nature.6 That
statement remains accurate today.
The modern South Carolina ejectment statute provides that
a landlord is entitled to possession of the premises (1) upon a
tenant's failure or refusal to pay rent when due or demanded;
(2) upon the expiration of the term of tenancy; or (3) upon a
breach of the terms and conditions of the lease. An action for
ejectment is commenced, upon the application of a landlord, by
the issuing of a Rule to Show Cause to the tenant.' The tenant
then has ten days to respond, either by vacating the premises or
by appearing before a magistrate to show why he should not be
ejected." If the tenant fails to answer within ten days, the magistrate will issue a warrant of ejectment, and the tenant will be
ejected. 10 If necessary, a warrant of possession will follow.11
5. 13 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SouTH CAROLiNA No. 4790 (1866)[hereinafter cited

as 1866 statute].
6.
7.
8.
court,

State ex rel. O'Neale v. Fickling, 10 S.C. 301 (1878).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-10 (1976).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-20 (1976). The action may be commenced in magistrate's
circuit court, or county court. Id. at § 27-33-40 (1976).

9. Id. at § 27-37-20 (1976).
10. Id. at § 27-37-40 (1976). The warrant must be written. Thompson v. Rutland,
225 S.C. 485, 83 S.E.2d 163 (1954).
11. S. Spitz, Landlord-Tenant Remedies Under South Carolina Law, Appendix,
form 3 (June 19, 1981)(Continuing Legal Education lecture).
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The current ejectment statute differs from the 1866 statute
in several ways. Jury trials are permitted under the current statute, yet were not allowed in 1866.12 The current statute provides
ten days for the tenant to respond to the Rule to Show Cause,
while only three days were allowed in 1866.13 More importantly,
the current statute greatly expands the scope of ejectment proceedings: the 1866 statute limited ejectment to tenancies of domestic servants and tenants at will; 14 the current statute applies

to all landlord-tenant relationships."' Significantly, a fundamental requirement of the 1866 statute remains unchanged. As was
required in 1866, the modern plaintiff in ejectment must demonstrate that a landlord-tenant relationship exists between himself
and the defendant. 16
B. Defining the Landlord-Tenant Relationship
1. South Carolina Definitions
When does a landlord-tenant relationship exist? At various
times, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that such a
relationship can exist only when (1) a contract between the
would-be landlord and tenant contains the essential elements of
a lease, 11 (2) a tendnt has actually entered onto the leased premises,18 or (3) an owner transfers possession and control of his
property to another.19 A fourth definition is provided by the
South Carolina Code, which defines the terms "landlord" and
"tenant.,2o
The first and most commonly used definition requires a formal contract containing the essential elements of a lease. 21 This
12. Compare S.C. CODE ANN.§ 27-37-80 (1976) with 1866 statute, supra note 5.
13. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-20 (1976) with 1866 statute, supra note 5.
14. See 1866 statute, supra note 5.
15. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-20 (1976).
16. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 224 S.C. 429, 79 S.E.2d 459 (1954); Ex Parte Associated
Hotels, 144 S.C. 483, 142 S.E. 600 (1928).
17. See, e.g. B-L-S Constr. Co. v. St. Stephen Knitwear, Inc., 276 S.C. 612, 281
S.E.2d 129 (1981); Ex Parte Associated Hotels, 144 S.C. 483, 142 S.E. 600 (1928).
18. See, e.g., Simon v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E. 614 (1927); Wilcox v. Bostick, 57 S.C. 151, 35 S.E. 496 (1900).
19. See, e.g., Ex Parte Associated Hotels, 144 S.C. 483, 142 S.E. 600 (1928).
20. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-33-10(7),(8)(1976).
21. See B-L-S Constr. Co. v. St. Stephen Knitwear, Inc., 276 S.C. 612, 281 S.E.2d
129 (1981); Ex ParteAssociated Hotels, 144 S.C. 483, 142 S.E. 600 (1928); Stewart-Jones
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definition evolved out of the South Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in Stewart-Jones Co. v. Shehan,22 in which the court
held that "a contract, express or implied, must be shown between the parties" before ejectment would be ordered.2 The
court added the "essential elements" requirement with its decision in Columbia Ry. Gas & Electric Co. v. Jones,24 in which it
held that the essential elements of a lease necessarily included
(1) a grant of possession and exclusive use and enjoyment of the
property; (2) definite consideration or rent; and (3) a certain
term or duration of the leasehold.2 5 In the most recent application of this definition, B-L-S Const. v. St. Stephens Knitwear,
Inc.,26 the South Carolina Supreme Court considered the validity of an alleged oral lease. Finding that a contract containing
essential elements of a lease had been proved, the court held
that a proper landlord-tenant relationship existed.
Two problems exist with the contract-essential element definition. First, the court has not been consistent in deciding what
constitutes an essential element of a lease. For example, in both
Columbia Gas & Electric and St. Stephens Knitwear, the court
stated that a lease must include terms establishing "a definite
' Yet, in Ryan v. Marsh's
consideration" and a "certain term."28
29
Administrator, the court found that a lease had been created
notwithstanding the lack of rent or other definite consideration
within the agreement."0 Similarly, in Wilcox v. Bostick, 1 the
court, in dictum, fully approved a lease which contained no definite ending date. 2
A second difficulty with the contract-essential element definition is even more fundamental: it has been far from the sole
criterion the court has used in defining a landlord-tenant rela-

Co. v. Shehan, 127 S.C. 451, 121 S.E. 374 (1924); Columbia Ry. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Jones,
119 S.C. 480, 112 S.E. 267 (1922).
22. 127 S.C. 451, 121 S.E. 374 (1924).
23. Id. at 457, 121 S.E. at 376.
24. 119 S.C. 480, 112 S.E. 267 (1922).
25. Id. at 490-91, 112 S.E. at 271.

26. 276 S.C. 612, 281 S.E.2d 129 (1981).
27. Id. at 614, 281 S.E.2d at 130.
28. Id.; 119 S.C. at 490-91, 112 S.E. at 271.

29. 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 156 (1819).
30. Id. at 157-58.

31. 57 S.C. 151, 35 S.E. 496 (1900).
32. Id. at 154, 35 S.E. at 496-97.
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tionship. On occasion, the court has concluded that no landlordtenant relationship can exist unless the tenant has actually entered the leasehold. 33 In Wilcox v. Bostick, for example, the
court acknowledged that the parties had entered into an agreement which contained the standard terms and conditions of a
lease. 3 The court further recognized that within the agreement
the parties referred to themselves as lessor and lessee.35 Nevertheless, the court found no landlord-tenant relationship could
exist,36 reasoning that a tenant must actually enter onto the
leased premises37 for a landlord-tenant relationship to start.3 8
The entry requirement, whatever may be said in favor of
it, 9 seems to defy common sense. In essence, it is a test which
determines whether a landlord-tenant relationship exists by ignoring all evidence that the parties actually intended to be
landlord and tenant. If, as was certain in Wilcox,

40

the parties

intend to be landlord and tenant, why not give effect to that
intent?
A third definiton of landlord and tenant stems from the
South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Rakestraw v.
Floyd. 1 In Rakestraw, the question was whether a laborer, hired
to grow cotton on another's property, had entered into a tenancy
or was merely an employee of the defendant. The laborer, claiming a tenancy existed, sublet the premises without his employer's
knowledge or permission. Both the employer and the alleged
subtenant claimed ownership of cotton grown on the premises.42
The employer based his claim on an employment contract with
his employee. He denied that a lease ever existed, and also denied all knowledge of the subtenancy, arguing that since the employee was not a tenant, there was no power to sublet.43 The

33. See, e.g., Simon v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E. 614 (1927); Wilcox v. Bostick, 57 S.C. 151, 35 S.E. 496 (1900).
34. 57 S.C. at 154, 35 S.E. at 496-97.
35. Id, at 154, 35 S.E. at 496.
36. Id. at 154-55, 35 S.E. at 497.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The entry requirement is really only a part of the interesse termini doctrine,
discussed infra at notes 154-84 and accompanying text.
40. See 57 S.C. at 154, 35 S.E. at 496-97.
41. 54 S.C. 288, 32 S.E. 419 (1898).
42. Id. at 289, 32 S.E. at 419-20.
43. Id. at 289, 32 S.E. at 420.
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subtenant argued that the employment agreement was a lease
and based his claim of ownership in the cotton on a tenant's
right to sublet leased property without the owner's consent or
knowledge."
The court reviewed the agreement between the employee
and employer, noting that the parties to the agreement had not
referred to themselves as landlord and tenant, and that "expressions appropriate to the creation of the relation[ship] of employer and laborer" existed within the agreement.45 Choosing
not to give conclusive effect to the words used by the parties, the
court focused on the question of which party "had the right to
the possession and control of the land for the period mentioned
in the writing.

' 46

Finding that under the agreement the em-

ployee had right to both possession and control, the court concluded that the agreement was a lease.47
To its credit, the approach in Rakestraw does more than
merely search for the terms of a lease. By considering not only
the words used but the acts performed by the parties, the
Rakestraw approach parallels section 1.2 of the Restatement
Second of Property, which suggests that a landlord-tenant relationship exists when a transfer of possession occurs.48
A final approach to defining the landlord-tenant relationship is statutory.49 The South Carolina Code defines "landlord"
as "a person in possession or entitled to possession of the real
estate used or occupied by the tenant as well as the employer of
farm laborers and domestic servants." 50 "Tenant at will" is defined as "every person... using or occupying real estate without an agreement, either oral or in writing."5 1 Seemingly, the
language of the statute that permits a person to be a tenant
without an agreement has invalidated, to some extent, the necessity of a contract and perhaps even the necessity of the tenant's
44. Id. at 289, 32 S.E. at 419-20.
45. Id. at 293, 32 S.E. at 421.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 292-93, 32 S.E. at 421.
48. "[A] landlord-tenant relationship exists only if the landlord transfers the right
to possession of the leased property." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 1.2 (1977).
The reporter's notes to section 1.2 note that "the key question is that of control." Id. at
13.
49. See S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 27-33-10 (1976).

50. Id.
51. Id.
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entry, as discussed earlier. 2

The extent to which the statutory definitions have displaced
the prior definitions for determining a landlord-tenant relationship remains unclear. For example, the statute provides that
"tenant" is "construed to include sharecropper.""3 Yet sixteen
years after the statute was enacted, the South Carolina Supreme
Court held, in Green v. Turbeville,54 that a sharecropper may be
either a tenant or a partner, depending upon the facts of the
particular case.5 5 Under the facts of Turbeville, no landlord-tenant relationship existed because none was intended by the parties.56 This result appears to be sound; if the parties actually intended not to be landlord and tenant, they should be allowed
the freedom to enter into some other relationship. Unfortunately, even given the apparent soundness of the Turbeville result, it does not lessen the confusion created by the various definitions of landlord and tenant that exist in South Carolina.
2. Definition for Purposes of Ejectment
The multiple definitions of landlord-tenant in South Carolina create a question as to what the word "landlord" means as
it is used in the ejectment statute. Heydon's Case,57 a classic
E nglish case decided over three-hundred-fifty years ago, suggests a partial answer. In Heydon's Case, the court stated that
to provide "for the sure and true . . . interpretation of all statutes. . . the office of all the Judges is always to make such...

construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the
remedy

.

.

according to the true intent of the makers of the

Act." ' Thus, in defining the term landlord as used in the eject-

52.
53,
54.
55,
56,

See supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-33-10(8)(1976).
263 S.C. 456, 210 S.E.2d 743 (1974).
Id. at 459, 210 S.E.2d at 744.
See id. at 458, 210 S.E.2d at 743.

57, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584). See also Willis, Statute InterpretationIn a Nutshell,
16 CAN. BAR. REV. 114 (1938) ("Heydon's Case lays down a special rule for the interpre-

tation of statutes and insists that you cannot interpret a statute properly until you know
the social policy it was passed to effect. Before you look at the words of the Act you have

to discover why the Act was passed; then, with that knowledge in your mind, you must
give the words under interpretation the meaning which best accomplishes the social pur-

poses of the Act").
58. 76 Eng. Rep. at 638.
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ment statute, both the purpose to be advanced by ejectment and
the mischief to be avoided are relevant inquiries.
The South Carolina ejectment statute of 1866 was designed
to provide a "summary" and "expeditious" alternative to the existing methods of regaining possession of leased premises.59 Prior
to 1866, a landlord could regain possession from a tenant only
by invoking the uncertain remedy of self-help6" or incurring the
lengthy delay of a title action. For obvious reasons, neither alternative was attractive. Owners of real property likely hoped that
the ejectment statute would alleviate the "mischief" of delay
and advance the "remedy" of regaining leased premises.
In ejectment, the fundamental question seems to be
whether possession of the premises was transferred. If it was,
then calling the owner a landlord arguably operates to advance
the remedy and suppress the mischief of the statute, even
though for purposes other than ejectment, the owner may well
not be a landlord. The case of Ex Parte Associated Hotels61 illustrates this approach and suggests how existing law might be
changed.
The plaintiff in Associated Hotels, believing
that he was a
landlord, commenced ejectment proceedings. The defendant
moved to dismiss on the grounds that no landlord-tenant relationship existed.62 In examining the written agreement between
the parties, the court was apparently concerned only with a
search for the essential elements of a lease. Finding such elements missing, the court concluded that the agreement established the relationship of principal and agent, or perhaps a partnership, but not a landlord-tenant relationship. 3 Dismissal of
ejectment proceedings was therefore ordered.
Another result is possible. The court ignored the defendant's agreement to "operate [the plaintiff's] property for a period of six months. '64 The court also apparently overlooked lan-

59. O'Neal v. Fickling, 10 S.C. 301 (1878).
60. See Laurens Telephone Co. v. Enterprise Bank, 90 S.C. 50, 72 S.E. 378 (1911);
Rush v. Aiken Mfg. Co., 58 S.C. 145, 36 S.E. 497 (1900) in which the right to self help is
generally recognized. The leading South Carolina case actually applying the self help rule
is Barbee v. Winnsboro Granite Corp., 190 S.C. 245, 2 S.E.2d 737 (1939).
61. 144 S.C. 483, 142 S.E. 600 (1928).
62. Id. at 489, 142 S.E. at 601.
63. Id. at 489, 142 S.E. at 602.
64. Id. at 485, 142 S.E. at 601.
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guage in the agreement providing that "[the defendants]
understand that it is impossible for [the plaintiff] to guarantee
[the defendant's] continued possession of the hotel." 5 Although
a transfer of possession and control of the premises took place
without the parties calling themselves landlord and tenant and
without a formal grant of possession, the transfer clearly took
place. Under Heydon's Case, Rakestraw, and the Restatement
Second of Property, such a transfer of possession and control
would create a landlord-tenant relationship.
Of course, it might be argued that the court in Associated
Hotels was concerned solely with the intent of the parties, reasoning that, when intent to create a landlord-tenant relationship
is unclear, no relationship should exist. Such a rationale appears
meritorious in nonejectment situations, as little policy justification exists in not giving full legal effect to an agreement in which
the parties have intended to create a lease and have included all
of the essential elements of a lease in their agreement.6" Conversely, when the facts clearly demonstrate that the parties did
not intend a landlord-tenant relationship, little justification ex6 7
ists for ignoring the intent.
Different considerations surface in ejectment situations,
however. The problem cases are likely to be those in which the
intent of the parties to create a landlord-tenant relationship is
uncertain or disputed. When intent cannot be ascertained, the
question of whether possession and control of the premises has
been transferred should become the central issue. Focusing on
that issue instead of intent to determine the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship appears more practicable-and ultimately more consistent-than the numerous methods currently
in use.
Regardless of whether the South Carolina Supreme Court

65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Under this analysis, the Wilcox decision, discussed supra at notes 31-38 and
accompanying text, in which the court found no landlord-tenant relationship solely because of the tenant's lack of entry, is clearly questionable. Indeed, the doctrine relied
upon by the Wilcox court-interessetermini-is itself based on uncertain ground. See
infra notes 154-84.
67. Under this analysis the court's conclusion in Green v. Turbeville, discussed
supra at notes 54-56, would be acceptable. Notwithstanding the statutory definitions, in
non-ejectment cases the parties should be allowed to determine their legal status as they
see fit.
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adopts a definition of landlord-tenant which looks not only to
the intent of the parties but to the acts of transfer of possession
and control as well, it is doubtful that all confusion in defining
the landlord-tenant relationship would be resolved. If the past
may serve as a guide to the future, the only certainty in this area
is that some degree of uncertainty will persist. Nevertheless,
more consistant application of a more practicable definition of
the landlord-tenant relationship can only serve to quell some of
the confusion.
C. Lack of Tenant Defenses
"Possession," Lord Mansfield once wrote, "is very strong,
rather more than nine points of the law." 8 He was not writing
about a tenant's possession of leased premises in South Carolina,
however. A South Carolina landlord can eject a tenant in an "exceedingly summary" manner,69 and the tenant's defenses to
ejectment are very limited.
South Carolina appears to follow the common law rule that
landlord and tenant covenants are independent of each other.
This means that the failure of the landlord to perform his covenants cannot excuse a tenant from performing his own covenants. Thus, under the independent covenant rule, a tenant cannot justify his nonpayment of rent by pointing to the landlord's
breach of covenant. This rule, in disfavor elsewhere, apparently
remains in force in South Carolina and is applied in ejectment
proceedings.
The independent covenant rule can be particularly harsh in
its application, as was demonstrated in Wright v. Player.7 0 The
tenants, a husband and wife, held a life tenancy in a farm. Their
lease, executed in 1951, provided that rent was due each October
for the coming calendar year. In 1956 the owner sold the farm to
another, and the new owner sent written notice to the tenants,
demanding that they relinquish possession on January 1, 1957.
The notice also directed the tenants to make future rent payments directly to the new owner's attorney.7 1 The tenants, who
68. Corporation of Kingston-upon-Hull v. Homer, 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 815 (1774).
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-10 to -150 (1976).
70. 233 S.C. 223, 104 S.E.2d 289 (1958).

71. Id. at 224-25, 104 S.E.2d at 289.
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easily could have been confused by the notice,72 chose to ignore
it and declined to either vacate the premises or pay the coming
year's rent. On January 8, 1957, the new owner commenced
ejectment proceedings, whereupon the tenants immediately tendered the year's rent.73 The tenants argued that the late payment of rent was properly excused by the new owner's wrongful
act of demanding possession. 4
The court made two holdings: first, that the ejectment was
proper and the new owner was not obligated to accept the late
tender of rent,7 5 and second, that the new owner's demand to
relinquish possession did not affect the tenants' obligation to
pay rent.7 6 The first holding, presumably based on section 27-35-

150 of the South Carolina Code, 7 permits a landlord to accept a
late rent payment and still proceed with ejectment; the second
holding reaffirms the independent covenant rule in South
Carolina.
The validity of the independent covenant rule has been
questioned in other jurisdictions, and many states have abolished it.7 s Even in South Carolina, although the rule has not

been expressly abolished, it may have been significantly undercut by the 1979 case of Anderson v. Marion.7 9 In Anderson, two
married couples owned equal shares of stock in a corporation.
One couple loaned money to the corporation. By agreement, the
other couple promised to repay the loan or forfeit their own
stock in the corporation if they failed to make repayment.8 0 On
the last day for repayment, the debtor couple tendered a check,

72. The demand to relinquish possession was wrongful because the tenants had
committed no default. Id. Furthermore, confusion could have resulted from the fact that
the demand to relinquish possession was clearly inconsistant with the directions to pay
future rent to the owner's attorney.
73. Id. at 225, 104 S.E.2d at 289.
74. Id.
75. Id, at 225, 104 S.E.2d at 290.
76. Id.
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-35-150 (1976).
78. E.g., Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrells, 78 II. App.3d 361, 397 N.E.2d 539 (1978);
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West. Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 111, § 1271
(West. Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 47-16-13 (1978). See also, MODEL RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, § 2-102(2)(Tent. Draft 1969)(proposing that all material covenants in a rental agreement be dependent).
79. 274 S.C. 40, 260 S.E.2d 715 (1979).
80. Id. at 41-42, 260 S.E.2d at 715-16.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss4/1

12

Landlord
Remedies In South Carolina? 799
1983] Spitz: Is It Time To Reform
LANDLORD
REMEDIES

which was returned for insufficient funds. A subsequent cash
tender was refused by the creditor couple on the ground that it
was made too late.81 The lower court found the cash tender untimely, and ordered transfer of the stock. 2 The South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the late payment was excused.83 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Littlejohn
quoted with approval language from Lane v. New York City
Life, 4 that "in equity the harsh remedy of forfeiture will be
forced to yield to compensation when fair dealing and good conscience seem to require it." 5 Although Anderson dealt with forfeiture of possession and title to stock and ejectment deals only
with loss of possession, an adverse ruling in an ejectment proceeding could be more immediately devastating for a tenant
than the mere loss of stock in Anderson. If equity permitted and
excused late payment in Anderson, it follows that similar results
should be reached in ejectment cases involving late payment of
rent.
Even if a landlord's breach does not excuse a tenant's performance, a strong argument exists that certain equitable defenses should be permitted in ejectment proceedings. In Wallace
v. Wannamaker,8 the court recognized that the ejectment statute should be strictly construed because it works a "forfeiture or
inflicts a penalty."' Certainly the forfeiture of a life tenancy in
Wright for failure to timely make a rent payment is as harsh as
the forfeiture in Anderson. The equitable defense permitted in
Anderson should also have prevailed in Wright.
Furthermore, the language of section 27-37-60 of the South
Carolina Code, that ejectment "should be determined as other
civil cases," 8 8 when read together with sections 15-1-80 and 1515-40 of the Code, arguably changes the purely legal nature of
ejectment in South Carolina. Section 15-1-80 provides that there
is only "one form of action for the enforcement or protection of
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 42, 260 S.E.2d at 716.
Id. at 43, 260 S.E.2d at 716.
147 S.C. 333, 145 S.E. 196 (1927).
274 S.C. at 43, 260 S.E.2d at 716.

86. 231 S.C. 158, 97 S.E.2d 502 (1957).
87. Id. at 163, 97 S.E.2d at 505.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-60 (1976).
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private rights and the redress of private wrongs." 9 Section 1515-40 provides that "the defendant may set forth by answer as
many defenses and counterclaims as he may have whether...
legal or equitable or both." 90 Read together, these statutes seemingly would permit equitable and other defenses in ejectment as
well as in other civil actions.
Indeed, even without considering the statutes, dictum from
Sheppard v. Nienow91 arguably permits equitable and other defenses in ejectment proceedings already. The court in Sheppard
confronted a tenant's claim against her landlord for injuries suffered by one of her children while playing on the premises. 92 Although the court found that under the facts of Sheppard the
tenant had no claim 9 3 it acknowledged that under different circumstances a tenant would have affirmative defenses and counterclaims against a landlord.9 ' The court suggested that when a
landlord promises to make repairs but fails to keep his promise,
a tenant may: (1) rescind the contract and abandon the premises; (2) make the repairs himself and deduct the expenses
through a counterclaim in an action for rent; (3) occupy without
repair and counterclaim to recoup damages for lack of repair in
the landlord's action for rent; or (4) sue for damages for breach
9 5
of contract.
This doctrine in Sheppard opens the door for a variety of
affirmative defenses in ejectment proceedings. If ejectment is
sought on the ground of nonpayment of rent and if there is a
valid legal reason permitting the tenant not to make such rent
payment, it seems a paradox to permit ejectment proceedings
without also considering that rent is not due when repairs or
other landlord covenants are not performed. In fact, this argument has already been offered and accepted in other
jurisdictions. 8

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at § 15-1-80 (1976).
Id. at § 15-15-40 (1976).
254 S.C. 44, 173 S.E.2d 343 (1970).
Id. at 46-47, 173 S.E.2d at 343-44.
Id. at 49, 173 S.E.2d at 345.
Id.
Id.
2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
E.g., Jack Springs Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.
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D. A Constitutional Question of Procedure
After the fourth circuit decision of Joy v. Daniels97 in 1973,
it was widely assumed that ejectment procedure in South Carolina was constitutionally sound under the fourteenth amendment. In Joy, the court held that the ejectment procedure met
due process standards because the landlord must actually prove
his allegations concerning the lease in court, and because either
party is entitled to request that such proof be made to a jury.98
Accordingly, after 1973, no reported South Carolina case questioned ejectment on due process grounds, and the issue appeared
to be foreclosed and fully settled. The 1982 United States Supreme Court decision of Greene v. Lindsey99 reopened the issue,
however.
In Greene, the Supreme Court examined a Kentucky statute similar but not identical to section 27-37-30 of the South
Carolina Code. Under the Kentucky statute,100 an ejectment action could be commenced by "posting" a notice "in a conspicuous place on the premises" if personal service could not be obtained on the tenant or a member of the tenant's family over the
age of sixteen. 1 ' The named class representatives in Greene
claimed that they never saw the posted summons left on the
doors of their apartments, and learned of the eviction proceedings only after default judgments had been entered against
them. 102 Relying on the due process standard enunciated in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,103 the Court
found the Kentucky statute unconstitutional because "merely
97. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
98. Id. at 1242-43.
99. 102 S. Ct. 1874 (1982).
100. Ky. REv. STAT. § 454.030 (1975). This statute provides:
If the officer directed to serve notice on the defendant in forcible entry or
detainer proceedings cannot find the defendant on the premises mentioned in
the writ, he may explain and leave a copy of the notice with any member of the
defendant's family thereon over sixteen (16) years of age, and if no such person
is found he may serve the notice by posting a copy thereof in a conspicuous
place on the premises. The notice shall state the time and place of meeting of
the court.
101. Id.
102. 102 S. Ct. at 1876.
103. 339 U.S. 306 (1949). That standard requires "notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action."
Id. at 314.
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posting notice on an apartment door does not satisfy minimum
1' 04
standards of due process. 1
In reaching the decision in Greene, the Court found that
service by mail was distinctly superior to service by posting
when personal service could not be obtained. 0 5 Relating that
finding to the parties in Greene, the Court noted that children
in the housing units sometimes removed the posted notices
before the tenants could receive the notices. Thus, "in a significant number of instances reliance on posting . . . results in a
failure to provide actual notice to the tenant concerned." 06
More generally, the Court found notice by mail to be inexpensive and efficient, and that when personal service is ineffectual,
"notice by mail may reasonably be relied upon to provide interested persons with actual notice of judicial proceedings."'0 7
In a portion of its opinion that reflects somewhat on the
South Carolina ejectment procedure, the Court rejected the argument that the posting of notice under the Kentucky statute
was only service as a "last resort" after other methods had
failed.10 The defendants in Greene noted that the statute directed the process server first to attempt personal service on the
tenant, and failing that, to attempt personal service on a suitable member of the tenant's family. Only after both of these
methods failed did the statute authorize service by posting. The
defendants argued that this constituted posting as a last resort,
and even if it was not preferable to mailing, it was nonetheless
constitutional under the circumstances."' The Court disagreed,
finding that posting was not a last resort under the statute. 10
The question of whether posting would be constitutional in a
true "last resort" situation was thus not determined in Greene.
The last resort question may arise in South Carolina. Like
the Kentucky statute, section 27-37-30 of the South Carolina

104. 102 S. Ct. at 1879.
105. Id. at 1880-81.
106. Id. at 1879.
107. Id. at 1880-81.
108. Id. at 1880.
109. Id.
110. The Court rejected the argument because under the statute, posting could occur on the process server's first visit to the tenant's apartment. See id. at 1880. The
statute did not require a second visit in a further attempt at personal service. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss4/1

16

Landlord
Remedies In South Carolina?
LANDLORD
REMEDIES
1983] Spitz: Is It Time To Reform

Code first directs that notice be personally served."' Unlike the
Kentucky statute, however, section 27-37-30 provides that when
personal service service is not possible, service can be made "in
the same manner as . . . provided . . . for the service of...

summons. . in the court of common pleas."'1 2 This latter authorization permits service on "any person of discretion residing
at the residence or employed at the place of business of the defendant."" 3 If personal service is still not possible, posting is
permitted only after the "premises have been unoccupied for
fifteen days or more."1 ' 4 The South Carolina statute thus

presents a situation in which posting is much more of a last resort, requiring at least a second visit to the leased premises
before posting is allowed.
The differences between the Kentucky and South Carolina
statutes may not mean much, however. Much of the Greene decision suggests that the posting of a notice is constitutionally insufficient, regardless of whether in a last resort situation or not.
Due process mandates that a person is entitled to proper notice
before being deprived of life, liberty, or property. Notwithstanding the fifteen-day abandonment requirement of the South Carolina statute, a tenant's extended vacation or similar absence
might exceed the statutory fifteen day period, yet not be intended as abandonment of the leasehold. Under such circumstances, notice by posting, although statutorily proper, could
nonetheless severely prejudice the tenant's right to due process.
Moreover, during such an absence, a tenant could receive actual
notice by mail if he had left a forwarding address with the Post
Office.
The cost of mailing is relatively inexpensive-in many cases
less than the cost of sending a process server to determine if
premises are unoccupied. Yet beyond the cost, the potential fairness to the tenant and the enhanced certainty of the notice
should be considered. These considerations suggest that, even if
section 27-37-30 is valid after Greene by virtue of its differences
from the Kentucky statute, an amendment requiring notice by
mailing may be sound legislation even if not constitutionally

111.
112.
113.
114.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-30 (1976).
Id.
Id. at § 15-9-520 (1976).
Id. at § 27-37-30 (1976).
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compelled.
III. ACTION FOR RENT
A.

Introduction to the Remedy

From the landlord's viewpoint, a lease creates both the loss
and gain of an important right. The landlord's loss is possession
of the premises; the landlord's gain is the right to recover rent
payments.115
Ejectment deals only with the landlord's loss. Although it
does dispossess the tenant, thus restoring possession of the
premises to the landlord, ejectment is a limited remedy which
offers less than complete relief, restoring what has been lost but
failing to enforce what might have been gained. The only way a
landlord may seek the full benefit of his bargain with the tenant
is through an action for rent.
B. Elements of an Action for Rent
Early South Carolina case law stated that, in order to maintain an action for rent, a landlord must allege an express or implied contract with a tenant." 6 This is no longer accurate. In
Townsend v. Singleton,117 the South Carolina Supreme Court
acknowledged that rent can be due even though no agreement
exists between landlord and tenant. The basis for the Townsend
decision is found in the South Carolina Code.
Section 27-35-40 of the Code provides that a person who enters or uses real property of another without the permission of
115. The question of whether, under South Carolina law, a landlord is ever entitled
to both possession and rent is uncertain, since the two remedies are mutually inconsistent. See Gentry v. Recreation, Inc., 192 S.C. 429, 436, 7 S.E.2d 63, 66 (1940). Yet Gentry
relies upon Simon v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E. 614 (1927), which contains dictum stating that "the termination of a lease does not absolve the lessee from obligations,

unless the lease shall provide that, notwithstanding the termination for cause by the
lessor, the lessee shall not be relieved of such future obligations. Id. at 262, 139 S.E. at
618 (emphasis added).
116, Cathcart v. Matthews, 105 S.C. 329, 89 S.E. 1021 (1916) (dictum); Ryan v.
Marsh, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 156 (1819); See also Lee v. Sumter Pine & Cypress
Co., 113 S.C. 190, 203, 102 S.E. 2, 6 (1915), in which the court held that a judgment for
unpaid rent could not be sustained when the landlord failed to allege a contract, and its
breach, by the tenant.
117. 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893 (1971).
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the owner can be treated at the owner's election as either a trespasser or a tenant at will. 118 If the owner elects to treat the occupier as a tenant at will, the section further provides that "the
landlord shall have and be entitled to a reasonable rental for the
use and occupation of such premises .

...
119 Thus, the first

element of the landlord's action for rent is the tenant's use of
the landlord's property.
The second requirement is that rent be shown to be due and
owing. At common law, rent was due and owing only after the
tenant's term. 120 Legislation has .changed this in South Carolina.
The South Carolina Code now provides that "unless otherwise
agreed upon rents shall be payable monthly and at the end of
each calendar month, excepting rents for farm lands."'' Thus,
questions as to when rent is due and owing should arise infrequently under the Code.
C. Mitigation of Damages
By contrast, questions as to whether a landlord has fully
and properly performed the duty to mitigate damages may arise
frequently. 2 2 The duty of a landlord to mitigate damages has
been a subject of frequent commentary. 23 For years, a lease was
viewed solely as a conveyance under the rationale that the execution of the lease transferred an estate, and the lessee became
the "owner" of the estate for the term of the lease. 124 Accord-

118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-35-40 (1976). "Tenant at will" is defined as "[e]very per-

son other than the owner of real estate, excepting a domestic servant and farm laborer,
using or occupying real estate without an agreement, either oral or in writing .
" Id.
at § 27-33-10(3)(1976).
119. Id. at § 27-35-40 (1976).
120. See Brown's Administrators v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864).
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-35-90 (1976). The special rule for farm tenancies is found
in § 27-35-100.
122. See, e.g., Richman v. Jaray Corp., 192 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1951)(mitigation successful and landlord held to the difference between the agreed rental and rental received
from new tenant); E & S Inv. Corp. v. Richland Bowl, Inc., 264 S.C. 582, 216 S.E.2d 522
(1975)(landlord sought to mitigate by remodelling); Camden Inv. Co. v. Gibson, 204 S.C.
513, 30 S.E.2d 305 (1944) (landlord recovered damages for commission paid to rental
agent to find new tenant and amount of rent he would have received from original tenant
for two months' vacancy before new tenant was found).
123. 1 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.99 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY, § 221 (1968).

124. 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, § 221 (1968).
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ingly, the lessor's ownership of the property ceased for the
length of the term, requiring the lessor to avoid acts of dominion
over the premises for that time. This "conveyance theory" left
no place for a landlord duty to mitigate. Having conveyed all
rights in the property for the term of the lease, the landlord
could do nothing if the tenant prematurely abandoned the
premises.""
Since Burkhalter v. Townsend, 2 ' decided in 1927, South
Carolina has rejected the conveyance theory and has imposed an
affirmative duty upon landlords to mitigate damages. This duty
requires landlords to take reasonable steps to relet the premises
and, if successful, to apply any rent received toward the original
tenant's rental obligation. Perhaps the clearest statement of the
duty to mitigate can be found in the following jury charge:
If [the landlord] can by reasonable diligence, get a tenant and
put a tenant there, and minimize [his] damages, the law says
[he] must do it; make [his] damages as light as [he] can. If he
fails to do that, the law will not compensate him for his failure
or refusal to minimize his own damages, but it will compensate
him for what he could not minimize,
even though he tries and
27
fails, if he did try and fail.
Ample justification exists for the mitigation duty. As many
commentators have recognized and courts have increasingly
held, 128 leases contain elements of conveyance and elements of
contract. Once it is concluded that a lease is a contract, the duty
to mitigate follows from the principle that damages from a
breached contract cannot be recovered for losses a party could
have reasonably avoided.1 29 The Uniform Commercial Code also

125. In re Dant and Dant, 39 F. Supp. 753 (D.C.W.D. Ky. 1941); Wright v. Baughman, 239 Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965); J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY
(2d ed, 1975).
126. 139 S.C. 324, 138 S.E. 34 (1927).
127. National Bank of South Carolina v. People's Gro. Co., 153 S.C. 118, 124, 150
S.E. 478, 480 (1929).
128. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390
N.Y.S.2d 959 (1976); Parkwood Realty v. Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623
(1974).
129. J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, §§ 202-36 (1970); 5 A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §

1039 (1964).
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adopts this principle.13 0 In holding that a landlord of abandoned
leased property could not allow the property to stand idle, one
court noted that this rule exists on a policy level to prevent a
party from "passively suffering economic loss which could be
avoided by reasonable efforts."'' Although neither Burkhalter
nor National Bank fully explain the reasons for imposing mitigation, the fact remains that the duty to mitigate damages is a
fixed star for landlords in South Carolina. Therefore the difficulties in its application must be confronted.
The existing law is unclear as to what the duty to mitigate
entails. In Burkhalter, the court held that mitigation is an issue
of fact, and that a denial by the tenant of the reasonableness of
the landlord's efforts "necessarily put[s] [the landlord] to
proof"' 1' 2 of the question. Subsequent cases, however, are of little
help in explaining what proof is necessary. The court has said
133
only that such proof must show "reasonable diligence.'
"Reasonable diligence" is an imprecise term, and courts in
South Carolina and other states have not agreed on its meaning.
For example, advertising the availability of property is often
cited as a factor indicating a reasonable effort,3 4 yet failure to
advertise or list the property has been held as not necessarily
35
unreasonable, if other reasonable attempts to relet are made.
Similarly, placing a "for rent" sign on the premises may suffice, 1 6 but at least one court has held this a minimal act and
37
insufficient to establish reasonable diligence.1
Some courts have focused on the length of the vacancy between abandonment and reletting as useful in determining reasonableness, but this factor has proven difficult to apply. Several
cases have held that reasonable attempts to mitigate can be
shown, even though a replacement tenant is never found. 3 Yet,
a vacancy of seventeen months was held unreasonable in Lefrak

130. The applicable UCC provisions, as adopted by South Carolina, are found at

S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-704, -706, -709, -711, -712, and -715 (1976).
131. Wright v. Baughman, 239 Or. 420, 414, 398 P.2d 119, 121 (1935).

132. 139 S.C. at 332, 138 S.E. at 37.
133. Nat'l Bank of South Carolina v. People's Gro. Co., 153 S.C. at 124, 150 S.E. at

480.
134. In re Garment Center, 93 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1938).
135. Friedman v. Colonial Oil Co., 236 Iowa 140, 18 N.W.2d 196 (1945).

136. Parkwood Realty Co. v. Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d at 693, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
137. Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968).

138. Parkwood Realty, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974).
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v. Lambert, 39 despite the fact that the property was placed on
an availability list and advertised in major newspapers. 40 Moreover, at least one court has held that rental closely following the
expiration of a lease is an indication of lack of due diligence in
14 1
finding a new tenant during the term of the lease.
The confusion over what is "reasonable" extends to the
lease terms offered the replacement tenant. No South Carolina
case exists on this point. Out of state cases suggest several
equally plausible but inconsistent positions. Some courts have
held that landlords are under no obligation to alter the terms of
the original lease for the new tenant, 4 2 even when the new tenant proposes to lease the premises for a period exceeding the
original term at the original rental rate."4 3 Other courts have
held that landlords may make necessary and ordinary repairs
and alterations to the premises to accommodate a new tenant,
44
then charge the cost of these changes to the original tenant.
Conversely, some courts have found that major repairs are not
only unnecessary and not chargeable to the original tenant, 46
but may constitute implied acceptance of the original tenant's
offer to surrender, thereby
terminating the original tenant's obli46
gation to pay rent.
Courts also are divided over which party must bear the burden of proof on mitigation of damages. 47 Those courts placing
the burden on the tenant note that under contract law, the
breaching party should prove that the aggrieved landlord could
have prevented or minimized losses suffered. 48 Several commentators agree. 49 Conversely, placing the burden on landlords has

139. 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1976).
140. Id.
141. Vawter, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968).
142. E.g., Carpenter v. Wisniewski, 139 Ind. App. 325, 215 N.E.2d 882 (1966).
143. E.g., Woodbury v. Sparrell Print, 198 Mass. 1, 84 N.E. 441 (1908); Robinson
Seed Plant v. Hexter and Kramer, 167 S.W. 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
144. Baskin v. Thomas, 12 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Banks v. Berliner, 95 N.J. 267,
113 A. 321 (1921).
145. Ross v. Smigelski, 42 Wis. 2d 185, 166 N.W.2d 243 (1969).
146. Buford-Claimont, Inc. v. Jacob's Pharm. Co., 131 Ga. App. 643, 206 S.E.2d 674
(1974); Pinkerton's, Inc. v. Palmer, Inc., 113 Ga. App. 859, 149 S.E.2d 859 (1966).
147. 21 A.L.R. 3d 577 (1968).
148, See Parkwood Realty Co. v. Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623
(1974).
149. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, § 33 (1935); Comment,
Landlord-Tenant Legislation:Revising an Old Common Law Relationship, 2 PAc. L.J.
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been justified on the basis of the landlord's greater access to evidence of mitigation and the landlord's superior financial
position. 150
Neither a landlord nor a tenant can be certain what a jury
or court will conclude is "reasonable" when confronted with a
particular set of facts. It does not follow, however, that the task
of clarifying and defining the mitigation duty should be a hopeless one. One solution to the problem might be found by including the actual scope of the landlord's duty to mitigate directly
within the lease agreement. This part of the lease, which might
be called a mitigation clause, would set forth the steps the landlord must take to mitigate. A mitigation clause thus could serve
the same purpose as a liquidated damages clause in a contract.
D. Mitigation Clause
Liquidated damages clauses in contracts are commonplace.
If drafted properly, they are recognized as legitimate covenants
which permit the parties to a contract the right to set their own
measure of damages and to agree upon a reasonable sum to be
paid by the breaching party. 1" A liquidated damages clause thus
permits the parties to make certain and definite what otherwise
would be difficult to prove and hard to quantify. However, as
with any rule, there are limitations. The amount set must bear
evidence of a fair estimate of anticipated damages and cannot be
a penalty for or coercive deterrent to a breach.' 52
In leases, a similar clause could serve a similar purpose.
Like a liquidated damages provision, the purpose of a mitigation
clause would be to let both parties set the rules to govern mitigation, and would make certain and definite the landlord's duty
to mitigate. Several advantages exist in such a clause. First, if
the tenant prematurely terminated the lease, both parties would
be aware of the landlord's duties of mitigation. Thus, instead of
an uncertain, subjective question of reasonableness, one could
simply look to the lease to see whether the landlord did those
259, 269 (1971); James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 60 (1961).
150. See Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89
Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1976).
151. 22 AM. JUR. 2D, Damages §§ 221-35 (1980); 5 A. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1054 (1964).
152. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1063 (1964).
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things to mitigate that he covenanted to do. Second, in many
cases a mitigation clause would probably avoid full scale trials in
many cases. Instead of a complex question necessarily calling for
inference and debate, the issue often would be suitable for summary judgment. Of course, as in liquidated damages clauses, the
court must require that a mitigation clause be reasonable, and
that it reflect a good faith effort by a landlord to reduce damages. Drafting a clause to accomplish these purposes would not,
however, be difficult."' In appropriate situations, a mitigation
clause might also include the terms of a substitute lease or the
price reductions, if any, which the landlord may offer a substitute tenant.
The disadvantages to a mitigation clause seem few. If the
clause is not given conclusive effect on the mitigation question,
the landlord still may be entitled to argue that acting pursuant
to the clause is at least some evidence of reasonableness. Moreover, even if the clause is disregarded in its entirety, the landlord is merely returned to the common law standard of reasonableness, and is in no worse a position. On the other hand, if the
clause is found to be valid, the steps taken under it almost
surely will be approved. In short, there appears much to be
gained and little to be lost by routinely including such clauses
within a lease.
E. Interesse Termini
1. The Doctrine Generally
Normally, a tenant's breach of a lease or abandonment of
the premises entitles a landlord to an action for rent, assuming a
proper attempt to mitigate damages has been made. However, if
the jurisdiction recognizes the doctrine of interesse termini, an
action for rent is not available."" Instead, the landlord is entitled only to the difference in value between the rent owed and
the fair market value of the lease.155 This difference in value is
normally much more difficult to prove and is generally smaller in
153. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, § 12.1, Comment i (1977).
154. M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 34.5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
FRIEDMAN].

155. 85 A.L.R. 3d 514 (1968).
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amount than the rent owed. 56

The interesse termini doctrine applies in two distinct situations: (1) when a tenant has an immediate right to possession
but has not entered onto the premises, and (2) when the lease is
to begin in the future and the right to possession is postponed
until that time. 15 In both situations the doctrine states that
without an entry a landlord-tenant relationship simply does not
exist. 158 Until an entry takes place, only a future contract right
exists because no present estate has been granted. 159 Thus, the
doctrine holds, since no lease has been created, no rent is
owed. 8' As one Maryland court has noted, the interesse termini
rule thus presents "the uncommon issue of when a lease is not a
lease." The consequences of the rule can be unbelievably harsh. In
the South Carolina decision of Wilcox v. Bostick,'6 2 for example,

a tenant sued a landlord for possession of the premises. The
court found that the tenant had a valid lease, that the landlord
had repudiated the lease without justification before the tenant's
entry and that the tenant's failure to enter was due to the landlord's refusal to permit entry." 3 Nonetheless, applying the interesse termini rule, the court denied the tenant possession of the
premises. In giving its reasons for this result, the court said:
The lessee must enter into possession in order to acquire an
estate in the land.... Until entry of the lessee, the lessor remains in possession, and cannot be said to have deprived the
lessee of that which he never had. Therefore, in an action by
the lessee to recover possession of the lessor, the lessee must
allege an entry under the lease; otherwise, having no estate in
the land, he cannot compel the owner in possession to deliver
him the possession. There are other remedies
for a mere
breach of contract to give him possession.16
156. FRIEDMAN, supra note 154, at § 34.5.

157. Id.; 1 H.

TIFFANY, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §

37 (1910); See also

Note, Is Interesse Termini Necessary?, 18 COLUM. L. RaV. 595 (1918).
158. 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 86 (3d. ed. 1939).
159. 1 Am.LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.22 (A. Casner ed. 1952).

160.
161.
721, 327
162.
163.
164.

85 A.L.R. 3d 514 (1968).
Arthur Treacher's Fish and Chips, Inc. v. Chilum Terrace Ltd., 272 Md. 720,
A.2d 282, 283 (1974).
57 S.C. 151, 35 S.E. 496 (1900).
See id.
Id. at 154-55, 35 S.E. at 497 (emphasis added).
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The rule can produce equally harsh results when applied to
landlords. In the Maryland case of Arthur Treacher's Fish &
Chips of Fairfax,Inc. v. Chillum Terrace Ltd.,16 5 the tenant repudiated a 10-year lease shortly after signing it and before entry
onto the premises, but not before the landlord had undertaken
expensive renovations to accommodate the tenant's restaurant
business. Applying the interesse termini doctrine, the court concluded that no lease had been created, 16 that under the circumstances the landlord's claim for rent must be denied, 16 7 and that
the landlord was only entitled to the excess of the rent reserved
under the lease agreement over the reasonable rental value of
the premises at the time of the breach. 6 8
Two comments concerning the results in Wilcox and Arthur
Treacher's Fish & Chips are in order. First, the interesse termini doctrine was applied in these cases only at the expense of a
conflicting, well settled rule of law. In Wilcox, the South Carolina Supreme Court failed to apply the rule that specific performance is routinely granted when the subject matter of a contract is unique. 6 9 This rule fits the facts of Wilcox, in which the
subject matter was real estate, but the court, in applying interesse termini failed to follow it. Similarly, in Arthur Treacher's
Fish & Chips, the intent of the parties was to create a lease, yet
the Maryland court refused to apply the normal rule of law that
the clear intent of the parties to a contract will govern the
document.
The second comment is that neither decision cited or considered the historical reasons for the interesse termini rule.
However, commentators who have traced the origin and history
of the rule have uniformly criticized it. One commentator has
asserted that the rule is "all a mistake. 17 0 Another has stated
that "it is clear that from a time prior to the Statute of Uses,
and certainly since that statute, there has been no reason to apply the doctrine.' 7' A third found the rule "difficult to comprehend" and added:

165.
166.
167.
168.

272 Md. 720, 327 A.2d 282 (1974).
Id. at 729, 327 A.2d at 287.
Id.
Id. at 731, 327 A.2d at 288.

169. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1142 (1964).
170. 2 W. WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 139 n.10 (1947).
171. 1 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.22 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
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That one who has not entered is not a tenant is readily comprehensible, but that one who has an immediate right of exclusive possession and control for a term of years should not have
an estate for years, merely because he has not entered upon the
land, seems to involve a subversion of the conception of an estate which has ordinarily prevailed since the abolition of the
requirement of livery of seisin. A statutory conveyance of an
estate in fee simple without doubt vests an estate in the
grantee before entry, and it is difficult to see why a common
law conveyance
of an estate for years should have any less
17 2
effect.

The most powerful criticism of the rule comes from a recent
treatise on landlord-tenant law, in which the author argues that
the interesse termini rule can be waived by merely adding the
formality to a lease that the parties agree the lease will take effect without an actual entry. 73 If this argument is as sound as it
appears, the doctrine functions only as a trap for the unwary,
and no longer serves a useful purpose.
2. The Doctrine in South Carolina
The leading South Carolina case applying the interesse termini doctrine to landlords is Simon v. Kirkpatrick.74 In Simon,
the tenant signed a three-year lease but failed to take possession
or pay rent. After waiting unsuccessfully for several months for
the tenant to start the tenancy, the landlord exercised a right
under the lease to terminate the tenancy for failure to pay rent.
About a year later, unable to find a substitute tenant, the landlord brought an action for rent owed and not paid, as well as an
action for breach of contract.17 5 The court found that "as a matter of fact, Kirkpatrick,
the lessee, never went into possession of
76
the premises1

and concluded that "as a matter of law, there-

fore, the relation
of the landlord and tenant was never
1 77
consummated.
Normally, of course, this finding would permit a landlord
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

1 H. TiFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPEFRTY § 86 (3d ed. 1939).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 154, at § 34.5.
141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E. 614 (1927).
Id. at 253-55, 139 S.E. at 615-16.
Id. at 256, 139 S.E. at 616.
Id.
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only a contract remedy. The general rule is:
[tihe measure of damages applied to a breach is the same measure which is applied to a breach of contract to lease. Landlord
has but one cause of action for damages, and not a series of
claims for installments of rent as the rent accrues. The amount
of damages for breach of contract is much 7 8less, and is much
more difficult to prQve, than under a lease.2
However, the court in Simon ignored the rule that interesse termini limits a landlord to a contract remedy, and suggested instead that any of three remedies were available. The court first
suggested the landlord could bring an immediate suit for damages. Under this alternative, the tenant would be liable for "the
full amount of damages present and prospective which were the
necessary and direct result of the violation of the contract. ' 17 9
The proper measure of damages would be "the difference between the rent fixed in the lease and the rental value of the
premises for the entire term, at the time of the breach, together
with such special damages as [the landlord] may plead and
prove ....
"I
The second alternative suggested by the court was a breach
of contract suit brought simultaneously with the landlord's termination of the lease, if the lease so provided. The court said:
[t]he rule, as we understand it, is that the termination of a
lease does not absolve the lessee from obligations incurred up
to the date of termination, but it does absolve him from future
obligations, unless the lease shall provide that, notwithstanding
the termination for cause by the lessor, the lessee shall not be
relieved of such future obligations."8'
Finally, the court suggested that the landlord might wait for the
term to expire, and then sue for the difference between the
agreed rental and any rent he might have received in mitigating
his damages. 182
The doctrine of interesse termini is designed to create only
one remedy for landlords. Thus, it is ironic that the South Caro178.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 154, § 34.5 at 1201.
179. 141 S.C. at 259, 139 S.E. at 617.

180. Id.
181. Id. at 262, 139 S.E. at 618.
182. Id. at 259, 139 S.E. at 617.
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lina Supreme Court would create three distinct remedies in Simon while purporting to follow the doctrine. Further irony surfaces when it is recognized that despite the right to three
different remedies, the landlord in Simon was entitled to only
18 3
two months rent because of an election of remedy problem.
Notwithstanding the irony, however, the critical point in Simon
is the court's recognition of three separate remedies. It is not
important that the court, purporting to apply the traditional interesse termini rule, actually applied something very different.
It is important that the rule they did apply is a much better rule
and should be expanded upon.
Leases are both contracts and estates.8 4 It therefore seems
fundamentally sound to give a landlord whose lease has been
broken an election between contract and property remedies.
Such an election would serve several purposes. It would permit
an immediate suit, if the landlord so elected, when a tenant
breached. Yet, at the same time, if the landlord chooses to wait
for accrued rent and mitigate his damages, that option should be
available to him.
Even if the remedies granted in Simon are not expanded
upon, the decision should not be ignored. Whatever else the
South Carolina Supreme Court did in Simon, it did not follow
the traditional interesse termini rule, and that in itself is worth
noting. Little justification remains for the doctrine. It lacks support from commentators; it is inconsistent with other rules concerning intent and specific performance; and it gives one who is
not a true landlord more remedies than one who is. If interesse
termini disappears from South Carolina law, it will not be
missed by anyone.
IV.

A.

DISTRAINT

Introduction to the Remedy

Distraint, also known as distress, is the common law right of
a landlord to employ selfhelp by seizing a tenant's personal
property as security for payment of delinquent rent.18 5 Initially
183. Id.
184. 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 221 (1968).
185. 3A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW oF REAL PROPERTY §
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the remedy permitted a landlord to hold but not sell tenant
property. In 1869, however, an English statute empowered landlords to sell tenants' property at public auction and apply the
proceeds to the rent due.""6
The remedy of distraint has been described as harsh.18 7 The
Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code and the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act have recommended its abolition,188 and many states have repealed distraint by statute""g or
found it unconstitutional in court decisions.190 Critics of distraint have argued that it survives today only as a "feudal prerogative, adopted when no rights amounted to much of anything
except those of the owner of the land and when personal property was not so much prized as at the present.19 Nonetheless,
this "relic of the old feudal system"1 92 still exists in a number of
19
jurisdictions,193 including South Carolina. 4
B. Distraintin South Carolina
Distraint has had a checkered history in South Carolina.

1305 (1981); 2 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.47 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 2 H. TFFANY, THE LAW
OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 325 (1910).
186. 2 W. & M., ch. 5, § 1 (1689).
187. See Bagwell v. Jamison, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 249 (1840), in which the court stated
"[t]he remedy of distress is a rigorous proceeding, often harsh in its operation, not congenial to the spirit of our institutions and government, and not to be extended beyond
the clear and settled limits, except by express enactments of the Legislature." Id. at 253.
See also, 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 305 (1968).
188. MODEL RESIDENTiAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 3-403 (1969); UNIFORM RxsiDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 4.205(b)(1972).
189. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 34.03.250 (1975);

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6301
(1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.01 (West 1947). For a list of states which have adopted
the UNIFORM RESIDENTmAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT, see 7A U.L.A. 297 (Supp. 1981).
190. The decisions finding distraint unconstitutional have principally been based on
the omission of prior notice and hearing, as required by Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See, e.g., Stroemer
v. Shevin, 399 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Fla. 1973), Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp. 528 (M.D.
Pa. 1972).
Contra, Hitchcock v. Allison, 572 P.2d 982 (Okla. 1977) (landlord's seizure of tenant's property in mobile home under landlord's lien statute did not constitute state action and statute was constitutional when tested by fourteenth amendment).
191. Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1106, 1107 (1929).
192. See Youngblood v. Lowry, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 39, 39 (1822).
193. See, eg., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 8-301 to -332 (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 441.240-.260 (Vernon 1952); VA. CODE §§ 55-227 to -238 (1981).
194. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-39-210 to -290 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss4/1

30

1983]

Spitz: Is It Time To LANDLORD
Reform Landlord Remedies In South Carolina?817
REMEDIES

Originally established with the adoption of a 1712 statute," 5 distraint was abolished in 1868 by the state legislature,19 only to be
reenacted ten years later. 97 Since then it has undergone further
modifications."'
1.

Prima Facie Cases

The necessary elements for distraint were enumerated in
the 1930 case of Fidelity Trust & ManufacturingCo. v. Davis.',"
The court in Davis drew upon requirements found in prior cases
and held that, in order for distraint to be proper, (1) the relationship of landlord and tenant must exist; (2) the rent reserved
must be a sum certain; (3) rent must be in arrears; and (4) the
landlord's claim must be for rent only.2 00 The court has twice
reaffirmed these elements since Davis. 0 1
The requirement that a landlord-tenant relationship exist
for distraint to be proper presents two interesting questions.
First, what happens to the right of distraint when either the
landlord or the tenant assigns or sublets their interest in the
premises? Second, what happens to the right of distraint when a
tenant dies owing unpaid rent to the landlord?
The right of distraint after an assignment has been considered in three very old South Carolina cases. In Ragsdale v. EstiS,2o 2 the court held that after a tenant assigned his lease to another, he had no power of distraint over his assignee.20 3 By

195. 1712 S.C. Acts. 547.
196. 1868 S.C. Acts 106.
197. 1878 S.C. Acts 511. See Mobley v. Dent, 10 S.C. 417 (1878).
198. See Fidelity Trust & Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 158 S.C. 400, 404-07, 155 S.E. 622, 62425 (1930), which traces the statutory development of distraint in South Carolina. The
1946 and 1973 amendments to the distraint statute are probably the most imaportant
changes of recent years. See 1946 S.C. Acts 2584 and 1973 S.C. Acts 384.
199. 158 S.C. 400, 155 S.E. 622 (1930).
200. Id. at 407, 155 S.E. at 625. The court also mentioned a fifth condition, "when
the property belongs to the tenant in his own right." Id. This condition was probably
voided by the adoption of S.C. COD. ANN. § 27-39-260 (Supp. 1982), which provides that
a landlord may distrain property subject to a security interest under certain conditions.
See also § 27-39-250, which provides that "all property upon premises is subject to distress . . ." (emphasis added).
201. Frady v. Smith, 247 S.C. 353, 357, 147 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1966); Burnett v.
Boukedes, 240 S.C. 144, 153, 125 S.E.2d 10, 15 (1962).
202. 42 S.C.L. (8 Rich.) 429 (1832).
203. Id. at 430.
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contrast, in Stewart v. Gregg204 the court held that after a landlord assigned his interest in a lease, the assignee became the
purchaser of the landlord's title and assumed the landlord's
right to rent payments under the lease. The assignee therefore
was entitled to distraint for unpaid rent. In the most recent of
the three decisions, Staton v. Guillebeaux, 2 5 the court qualified
its holding in Stewart by holding that the "mere assignment of
the rent unpaid does not carry the right to distrain. "206
At one level the three cases are sound and consistent. In
each case the court appears to rest its decision on whether the
party seeking distraint has a landlord's reversion in the leased
premises. Thus, in Ragsdale, in which the tenant sought distraint
against his assignee, the court concluded that lack of privity207 between the parties barred distraint. Similarly, in Staton,
the party seeking distraint had no reversion. The landlord's reversion was transferred in Stewart, however, the only case allowing distraint by the assignee. Thus, a tenant may be able to
distrain a subtenant's property. Although no South Carolina
case has expressly addressed this issue, it is well known -that
when a tenant sublets to another, he "grants an interest. . . less
than his own, and retains for himself a reversion. ' 20 8 Furthermore, the South Carolina Code provides that "the sublessor,...
shall be deemed the landlord and the sublessee the tenant under
him.,,20,
At another level, however, the three cases are neither as
sound nor as consistent as they first.appear. The three decisions
rest on the technical distinction between assignment and sublease. The utility of drawing such a distinction has been questioned, however, and at least one non-South Carolinia case has
expressly recognized that the common law distinction between
210
assignments and subleases is arbitrary and unjust.

204. 42 S.C. 392, 20 S.E. 193 (1893).
205. 123 S.C. 363, 116 S.E. 443 (1922).
206. Id. at 368, 116 S.E. at 444.
207. Privity of estate is generally defined as "that which exists between lessor and
lessee, tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner, etc.. . ." BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY, 1362 (4th ed. 1968).
208. Fischer, Legal Aspects of Farm Tenancy and Sharecropping in South Carolina, 9 S.C.L.Q. 299, 345 (1957).
209. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-35-60 (1976).
210. See Jaber v. Miller, 219 Ark. 59, 60, 239 S.W.2d 760, 761 (1951).
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The South Carolina Supreme Court has determined that,
when a tenant dies, a landlord cannot execute a distress warrant
against the tenant's property, even though the warrant was issued and rent was due while the tenant was still living.211 Similarly, the court has held that if the landlord dies before the distraint warrant is executed, the landlord's personal representative
has no authority to distrain for rent accrued before the landlord's death.212 In contrast to these cases, the court concluded in
Taluande v. Cripps21 3 that a tenant's renewal of his lease for a

second year would not prevent the landlord from distraining for
rent due from the previous year. 214 Apparently the court felt

that the landlord-tenant relationship continued, even though the
old lease had expired and a new lease existed. 1
Can the death cases be reconciled with the renewal case?
Leases can be drafted by the parties with the intent to survive,
even if the landlord or tenant dies. It is common for devisees or
.heirs to step into a deceased tenant's shoes and continue the
lease. If a tenant's interest can continue, the landlord's
rights-including the right to distraint-should continue as
well.216 Indeed, an argument exists that the interests continuing
after death are more closely related to the initial landlord-tenant
relationship than in the case of a lease renewal, because the new
party taking the deceased party's place actually fulfills the original lease.21
The second element of distraint enunciated by the court in
Davis-that rent be for a sum certain-has been easier to apply
than the landlord-tenant relationship requirement. Perhaps the
most interesting case under this requirement is Reeves v. McKenzie,21 8 in which the court held that once rent is stated as a
sum certain in a lease, subject to the performance by the tenant

211. Salvo & Wade v. Schmidt, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 512, 517 (1844).
212. Bagnell v. Jamison, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 249, 252 (1840).
213. 14 S.C.L. (3 McCord) 147 (1825).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See 15 Am. Dec. 584, 585 (1825) and 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 677 (1968)
for a discussion of distress for rent.
217. Stewart v. Gregg, 42 S.C. 392, 398, 20 S.E. 193, 196 (1893); Marshall v. Giles, 5
S.C.L. (3 Brev.) 488, 489 (1814); Benoist & Dumouche v. Sollee, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 251,
252 (1803); Smith v. Sheriff, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 443, 444 (1795); Jacks v. Smith, 1 S.C.L. (1
Bay) 315 (1793).
218. 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 497 (1830).
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of some condition, the landlord may distrain for rent due despite
the condition unless the tenant proves performance.2 1
The third requirement from Davis is that the rent must be
due and unpaid at the time of the distress action. Accordingly, a
landlord may not distrain until the day after the rent becomes
due. Gentry v. Recreation,Inc.220 established the rule that rent

cannot be "deemed in arrears merely by virtue of a clause in the
lease attempting to accelerate the future and unearned rent,"
upon the tenant's abandoning the premises. 221 Thus, a landlord

may not distrain for rent not yet earned or accrued even though
the lease contains an acceleration clause.
Finally, distraint may be for rent only, precluding recovery
of other payments or promises owed to the landlord.222 An 1851
South Carolina case, Fraser v. Davie,223 commented on the form
of rent payments for purposes of distraint. In Fraser,rent was
payable in a crop-cotton-and the court held that distraint was
proper, since "anything susceptible of valuation is the subject of.
distress . .

22.4

2. South Carolina Statutory Procedure
Distress for rent is strictly regulated by statute in South
Carolina. 225 There are four basic statutory steps: (1) commencement of the distraint action and service of process; 226 (2) holding
a predistress hearing and issuing a distress warrant; 227 (3) en-

forcing the distress warrant;22 and. (4) the tenant's bond and

219. Id.
220. 192 S.C. 429, 17 S.E.2d 63 (1939).
221. Id. at 438, 17 S.E.2d at 67.
222. Apparently, no South Carolina case before Davis ever specifically stated this
limitation. In Davis, the court cited the old Ruling Case Law series as authority for its
position that distress is available for rent only. 158 S.C. at 407, 155 S.E. at 625. Other
jurisdictions have indicated similar limitations: interest on rent due, attorney fees incurred by the landlord, and enforcement of any covenant or condition specified in the
lease are inappropriate items for distraint. See, e.g., 49 Am. JUR. 2D. Landlord and Tenant § 732 (1970); 32 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 676 (1968).
223. 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 59 (1851). See also Huff v. Latimer, 33 S.C. 255, 11 S.E. 758
(1890).
224. 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) at 61.
225. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-210 to -360 (1976).
226. Id. at § 27-39-210 (1976).
227. Id. at § 27-39-220 (1976).
228. Id. at § 27-39-240 (1976).
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the property sale.22 9 To properly address the existing problems
with distraint, a brief description of each of these steps is
warranted.
The first step is the commencement of the distraint action
and service of process. A landlord begins the distraint process by
filing an affidavit with the magistrate in the district in which the
leased premises are occupied. The affidavit should state the
amount of rent due and the time and place for the predistress
hearing. Court costs can also be included. Notice of this hearing
together with the affidavit, is served on the tenant by the sheriff
or constable.2 30
The second step in the procedure is the holding of the
predistress hearing and issuance of a distress warrant. 31 The
predistress hearing, which cannot be held until five days after
service of process, is designed "to protect the tenant's use and
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment and to prevent unfair or mistaken deprivation of property. '23 2 After the
predistress hearing, the magistrate is empowered to issue a distress warrant only if he determines that the landlord's right to
distress is valid and the tenant has no overriding right to continue in possession of the property subject to distraint.2 33 If a
distress warrant is issued, it must specify the amount of rent
due.23 4 The warrant is delivered like the notice and affidavit to
235
an officer for enforcement.
The third step in the procedure is enforcing the distress
warrant. 23 6 Under the South Carolina Code, the officer to whom
the warrant is delivered must immediately demand payment of
the rent with costs from the tenant.2 37 If the tenant pays the
amount as requested, the officer is instructed by the statute to
return the warrant with the sum collected to the magistrate, who
then settles with the landlord. However, if the tenant fails or
refuses to pay the requested amount, the officer "shall distrain"

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at §§ 27-39-310, -320 (1976).
Id. at § 27-39-210 (1976).
Id. at §§ 27-39-210, -220 (1976).
Id. at § 27-39-220 (1976).
Id.
Id.
Id., directing that the warrant be delivered as set forth in § 27-39-210.
Id. at § 27-39-240 (1976).
Id.
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a reasonable quantity of the tenant's property which equals in
value the amount of rent due plus costs.2 38 When the officer
seizes the tenant's property, he is required to supply the tenant
with a written list of the distrained property and a copy of the
distress warrant. 239
The final step in the procedure is the posting of a bond by
the tenant 2 0 or the sale of the distrained property by the officer.241 Within five days after the distraint of the tenant's property, the tenant can reclaim the property by posting a bond payable to the landlord in double the amount set forth in the
distress warrant. The tenant must also supply sufficient surety
as approved by the court. In the event the tenant posts bond
with an approved surety, a hearing is held in the magistrate's
court.
If the tenant fails to give bond within the prescribed time
period, the officer may sell the distrained property at a public
auction to the highest cash bidder. Notice of the designated
place and time of sale must be posted upon the premises and at
two other public places in the county for five days prior to the
sale.24 2 The "landlord or any other person" may be a purchaser
at this sale, 243 but all purchasers take the property subject to
any tax liens existing against it.244 The amount of rent due is
paid to the landlord from the proceeds of this sale; the tenant is
paid any surplus proceeds that may remain.24 5
C. Problems With Distraint
1.

Request and Refusal

No remedy is effective if it cannot be enforced. According to
a 1979 South Carolina Attorney General Opinion 246 and the 1980
South Carolina Benchbook for Magistrates, a distress warrant,

238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

§ 27-39-310 (1976).
§ 27-39-320 (1976).

242. Id.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at § 27-39-340 (1976).
Id. at § 27-39-330 (1976).
Id. at § 27-39-350 (1976).
1979 Op. Att'y Gen. 13.
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even after a proper predistress hearing, is enforceable only when
a sheriff can gain peaceable entry onto the leased premises. The
Benchbook states that when an officer attempts to enforce a distress warrant but is refused entry by the tenant, he must retreat
and return the warrant not served.247 The Attorney General
Opinion provides that "[a] sheriff or his deputy does not have
the authority to break and enter a house, after request and refusal, to distrain sufficient property upon the rented premises 24to8
pay rent and costs under the authority of a distress warrant.1
Thus, a tenant apparently can bar the remedy of distraint by
refusing an officer's request for entry. The Benchbook cites only
the Attorney General Opinion for authority; that Opinion, in
turn, rests its conclusion almost exclusively on two South Caro2 50
lina cases, State v. Christensen249 and Jones v. Parker.
State v. Christensen, a 1940 case, is the more recent decision. The case contains language that the levying of a distress
warrant must be accomplished without "break[ing] the
house. ' 25 1 That language, however, is mere dictum. The person
charged with the taking of the tenant's property in this case was
not a sheriff, but a private individual who had not obtained a
distress warrant from a magistrate authorizing the seizure. Thus,
while Christensen may have been rightly decided, it cannot support the rule that a sheriff with a proper distress warrant, cannot use force in levying on tenant's property.
Jones v. Parker is more on point. There, a sheriff with a
distress warrant was levying on a tenant's property. The court
approved a jury charge which stated that "one having a distress
warrant properly issued, for past due debt for rent, must get
peaceable possession of the property. '2 52 Although this charge
supports the Attorney General's Opinion, the facts in Jones
raise some doubts.
The sheriff in Jones was charged with committing an assault and battery on the tenant's wife while in the process of
distraining the tenant's property, thereby causing her to mis-

247. SOUTH CAROLINA BENCHBOOK FOR MAGISTRATES, 11-95 (1980).

248. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. 13.
249. 194 S.C. 131, 9 S.E.2d 555 (1940).

250. 81 S.C. 214, 62 S.E. 261 (1908).
251. 194 S.C. at 139, 9 S.E.2d at 559.
252. 81 S.C. at 220, 61 S.E. at 266.
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carry. The court makes it unmistakably clear that the "action is
not for damages arising out of the levy, but for assault and bat-

tery. 25 3 Thus, while Jones can be read to support a rule that dis-

tress in a high-handed manner with excessive force is illegal and
wrongful, a reading totally prohibiting any force whatsoever in
enforcing a distress warrant is less certain. Assuming, however,
that all force is barred for purposes of enforcing the distress
warrant on the ground that the sheriff would thereby be guilty
of "invasion of the rights of the tenant unwarranted in law,"'" it
does not necessarily follow that the landlord is left remediless or
that the tenant is free to follow the Attorney General Opinion
without potential difficulty.
While the Benchbook and Attorney General Opinion unequivocally provide that a warrant of distress does not carry sufficient authority to permit forcible entry, a tenant who chooses
to refuse an officer's request may be committing a criminal offense under the South Carolina Code.255 In this truly difficult
situation, a tenant has only the choice of being distrained
against or exercising rights found in the Attorney General Opinion, the Benchbook, and Jones v. Parker at the risk of being
fined and/or imprisoned under the obstruction of justice statute.
Moreover, a landlord may have a remedy even when an officer is refused peaceful entry-claim and delivery. Apparently,
although force cannot be used in distraint, it can be used in
claim and delivery.256 Under that statute, an officer is authorized
to enter any dwelling after request and refusal to seize the tenant's property, 257 provided the officer has process requiring the
seizure of such property. 258 Furthermore, it appears that it is
proper for a landlord to initiate a claim and delivery action at
the same time a distraint affidavit is submitted to a magistrate.258 Providing claim and delivery as an alternative to dis253. Id.
254. Christensen, 194 S.C. at 139, 9 S.E.2d at 559.
255. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-320(a)(Cum. Supp. 1982), which makes it a misdemeanor to oppose or resist any law enforcement officer who is serving, executing, or attempting to serve or execute any legal writ or process. A warrant of distraint arguably
would be such a writ.
256. See id. at §§ 22-3-1310 to -1480 (1976) for claim and delivery.
257. Id. at § 22-3-1420 (1976).
258. Id. at § 22-3-1410 (1976).
259. See SOUTH CAROLINA BENCHBOOK FOR MAGISTRATES, H-95 (1980).
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traint undercuts whatever policy reasons exist for not permitting
some force to be used with distraint. Certainly, it is inconsistent
with the court's decision in Jones to alleviate the potentially
tense landlord-tenant problem of paying past due rent. 6 °
2.

The Tenant's Double Bond

If property is distrained, the tenant is entitled to have the
property returned by giving a bond payable to the landlord "in
double the amount claimed." 26 1 This raises a constitutional
question of whether the double bond requirement violates the
United States Supreme
equal protection clause in light of the
2 2
Normet.
v.
Lindsey
in
Court decision
In Lindsey, a group of Oregon citizens filed a class action
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible
Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute26 3 was unconstitutional on
its face. 2 " The statute in question required tenants found guilty
of failing or refusing to pay rent within the specified time 6 5 to
pay twice the rental value of the premises to secure a stay of
execution pending appeal.2 66 The court found that the double
bond provision violated the equal protection clause, 2' and that
it "heavily burden[ed] the statutory right . . . of [the] defendants to appeal" since the bond was "unrelated to the actual
rent accrued or to specific damages sustained by the landlord. ' 28 Because the double bond in effect "doubled the stakes"
of appealing and did not serve the goal of weeding out frivolous
appeals, the Court concluded obvious discrimination existed
against poor lessees who could pay rent pending appeal but

260. See 81 S.C. 214, 62 S.E. 261 (1908).
261. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-310 (1976).
262. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
263. O. Rav. STAT. §§ 105.105-.160 (1953). See 405 U.S. at 59 for the relevant provisions of this statute.

264. 405 U.S. at 58-60.
265. Or. REv. STAT. § 105.115(1)(1953). The failure or refusal to pay rent is the first
of the causes of "unlawful holding by force." The second cause is remaining in possession
after notice to quit, holding contrary to any clause in the lease, or holding in possession
without any written lease or agreement. O. REv. STAT. § 105.115(2)(1953). See 405 U.S.

at 59.
266. O.

11v.

STAT.

§ 105.160 (1953)(Repealed 1977).

267. 405 U.S. at 79.
268. Id. at 77.
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could not afford to post a double bond.
Thus, a clear United States Supreme Court mandate exists
against double bond provisions. If the South Carolina double
bond distraint provision is challenged, it may be found unconstitutional after Lindsey v. Normet.
Whether the landlords' remedy of distraint should continue
is ultimately a question for the legislature to answer. The double
bond provision, the lack of an enforcement mechanism in the
face of request and refusal of entry, and conflicts with the current obstruction of justice statute need clarification. If distraint
is deemed desirable by the legislature, these problems will need
to be resolved, for as the statutes now stand, distraint creates
more problems than it alleviates.
V.

CONCLUSION

To answer the question posed at the beginning of this Article, it is time to reform landlord-tenant law in South Carolina.
Doctrines such as the independent covenant rule and interesse
termini have outlived their usefulness and should be replaced by
laws which more adequately address contemporary concerns.
Confusion as to when a landlord-tenant relationship exists for
ejectment purposes, or when a landlord has been reasonably diligent in mitigating his damages, or whether an officer bearing a
distraint warrant can enter a tenant's home should be clarified.
Because the scope of this Article has been limited to an examination of landlord remedies, proposals for reform from this
author must necessarily be limited in scope as well. Accordingly,
the following suggestions are offered:
In ejectment, a more practicable definition of the landlordtenant relationship is needed, perhaps one using the transfer of
possession and control of the premises as a criterion." 9 Furthermore, tenants should be allowed certain equitable defenses in
ejectment proceedings. 27 0 Finally, an amendment to the eject-

ment statute providing for service by mail when personal service
fails would be more effective
and more cost efficient than the
1
7
current posting statute.1

269. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 68-96 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
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In the landlords' action for rent, the use of mitigation
clauses in leases would alleviate the courts' dilemma of trying to
determine when a landlord's efforts at mitigation have been reasonable. 2 Second, although the South Carolina Supreme Court
purported to use the interesse termini doctrine in Simon v.
Kirkpatrick decision, the rule it applied was different, allowing
alternative remedies to the landlord. 7 3 The court should follow
its own lead and abolish the doctrine of interesse termini.
Finally, in distraint, if the remedy is to continue, the legislature should consider making the distraint statutes more enforceable in the face of the request and refusal problem. 2 4 The legis-

lature should also reexamine the tenant's double bond provision
in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lind2 5
sey v. Normet.
These suggestions are by no means exhaustive. They do present a beginning, however. If used, they can serve as a starting
point from which the legislature and the courts can bring South
Carolina landlord-tenant law more in line with that of sister
states, and abolish the outmoded, archaic doctrines which are
better left to history books.

272. See supra notes 122-153 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 174-184 and accompanying text.

274. See supra notes 246-260 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 261-268 and accompanying text.
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